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by time,” to quote a character from the film Miller’s
Crossing.5 It might be possible that the answers to our
problems today lay beyond our own narrow history.
Roth does levy some thoughtful criticisms that
every administrator at an institution of higher education ought to consider. For example, he is fairly dismissive of emphases on both technical and vocational
programs, as well as the specialized research institution. While I do think there is a place for vocational
development and specialized research, it is interesting
that many small liberal arts colleges today, attempting
to answer current problems, are moving away from
their traditional arts and sciences roots to become either technical and vocational institutions (158, 190)
or specialized research institutions where faculty no
longer educate students liberally, but instead focus on
their own research agenda (104).
A second poignant criticism regards student evaluations and the power they have to change the educational experience for the worse (136-137). Roth writes,
“[T]he great bulk of the information [that university
officials] use to determine the quality of teaching is the
satisfaction of the students as expressed on surveys. In
his introduction to the 2002 edition of The Academic
Revolution, Jencks puts it this way: ‘So instead of giving students what grownups think the students need,
most teaching institutions are under considerable pressure to give students what they want’” (137).
Despite my criticisms of Beyond the University,
Roth has written an important and engaging book
that speaks to some of the most important problems
in higher education today. As a college president,
criticizing certain trends that are particularly popular
among college administrators, he shows that he swims

upstream, for which he ought to be applauded. This
book ought to be required reading for any administrator considering a move to technical and vocational education, or a push towards emphasizing research and
grant-winning. It is also recommended for anyone interested in knowing at least one strand of the development of higher education in American history. I hope
this fine book prompts discussion across American
colleges about the ultimate purpose of higher education.
Endnotes
1. Regarding the latter point, I’m thinking specifically of
Notre Dame’s 10-year curriculum review’s proposal of
dropping philosophy and theology requirements. See:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/
wp/2015/02/17/notre-dame-is-reviewing-its-curriculum-which-could-have-far-reaching-effects/.
2. G.K. Chesterton, The Collected Works of G.K.
Chesterton: Chesterton on Dickens (San Francisco:
Ignatius Press, 1989), 425.
3. As quoted by Charles Singleton in his translation
of Dante’s Divine Comedy. See Dante Alighieri,
The Divine Comedy: The Inferno, translated, with a
commentary, by Charles S. Singleton (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1970), 371.
4. Rebecca Newberger Goldstein, Plato at the Googleplex:
Why Philosophy Won’t Go Away (New York: Vintage
Books, 2014).
5. Miller’s Crossing. DVD. Directed by Joel Coen
and Ethan Coen. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corporation, 1990.
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For me, To the Edge is a headache to read. That
is not because it is overly long. Its seven chapters
are wrought in 218 pages. Nevertheless, the subject
matter of corporate finance and regulation is highly
complex. A plethora of laws, regulations, agency titles
(with acronyms), corporate titles, and terminology
from corporate and government finance litters the
text. The book is about the Great Recession in the
American economy that commenced in 2008 and the
ways that government policy makers and regulators
sought to deal with the causes and consequences of
a plunging economy. The scholar addressing this inquiry, Philip Wallach, is a Princeton Ph.D. in politics,

interested in the regulatory statutes of the American
administrative state. To reckon with his subject matter,
the reader must penetrate the inner workings, indeed
shifting sands, of the nation’s governmental and corporate bureaucracies.
Even the headline issues were difficult to understand from the onset of the economic crisis. After earlier economic tremors, in March 2008 the country’s
seventh-largest investment bank, Bear Stearns, approached financial insolvency. In an elaborate arrangement primarily engineered by Henry Paulson, then
Secretary of the Treasury, and Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, the government provided
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federal loan incentives to press J.P. Morgan Chase
Bank to acquire Bear Stearns and provide liquidity
to Bear Stearns’ customers. Half a year later, Lehman
Brothers, the nation’s fourth-largest investment bank,
suffered liquidity problems. This time the government
response was different. Judging that the consequences
and liabilities of a Bear Stearns-like solution were distinguishable from the Lehman case, Secretary Paulson
let it be known that no government aid was forthcoming. The result was that Lehman’s Board of Directors
unanimously voted for bankruptcy on September 15,
2008.
Also teetering on insolvency as the 2008 financial
crisis deepened were the federal government’s sponsored enterprises known as Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, quasi-governmental lenders for home mortgages.
Legally private corporations but created as federal institutions central to the mortgage market serving American homeowners, they were too big to be allowed,
by the federal government, to fail. Thus to save these
government-sponsored enterprises, Congress passed
the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008
(HERA) at Paulson’s and the Bush administration’s
urging. Responding to stock-price declines in Freddy
and Fanny shares due to investor fears about insolvency, Paulson used the new law to put Fanny and Freddie
under government conservatorship. Among the details
of the solution, the Treasury committed $100 billion
to each of them, later raising the allocations to $200
billion, thereby backing the net worth of the firms and
stanching downward market pressure on the prices for
Fanny and Freddie stocks.
The world’s fifth-largest insurance company,
American International Group (AIG), was also stuck
in the home mortgage business. One of its divisions,
by writing “credit default swaps” that insured the value
of mortgage-backed securities, went underwater when
the housing market downturn revealed that the mortgages underlying these securities were seriously overvalued. AIG was obligated to huge losses. As property
and security values plummeted, AIG exhausted its
liquid funds and bankruptcy was imminent. Where
could it access a capital infusion? After private sector
attempts to generate a financing package fell apart, the
Federal Reserve came up with a secured loan through
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for $85 billion,
but on very demanding terms (government ownership
and 12.5% interest). AIG’s board approved the deal.
To illustrate how the fever of declining asset values
can spread, he considers the money market mutual
funds (MMFs). For depositors, accounts in MMFs
were considered a safe preserver of financial value. But
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when Lehman went down, F, Reserve Primary Fund
(a major MFF), suffered a huge loss. When it was required by law to make the loss public, a run on its
funds began, and the run created panic in the MMF
market. The MMF loan business sustains short-term
financing for large corporate firms, for example, providing timely cash for their payrolls. In short, the panic
threatened to seize up a sector of the credit market that
would endanger a wide range of corporate enterprises.
The Federal Reserve created a short-term solution by
dispersing funds to banks in order to purchase MMF
assets so that they could satisfy investor redemptions.
The program put $150 billion into this specialized
market in its first ten days, successfully stanching the
need for investor redemptions and thereby reducing
redemption demands to normalcy.
Despite measures already described, the mortgage market continued to deteriorate. Paulson and
Bernanke expressed their need for more resources of
money and discretion to President Bush, who agreed
to a congressional proposal. The central element, remembered as TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program),
was to allow Treasury to buy devalued mortgage assets
from banks and investment firms. The initial proposal
was rejected with bipartisan opposition. The reaction
prompted the worst ever one-day drop on the Dow
Jones Industrial Average—778 points. Terror in the
financial sector stimulated changed views in Congress.
In the first week of October 2008, the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act became law, funding
TARP with $700 billion and giving tools of discretion to Bernanke and Paulson. In a rapid fashion, the
Treasury directly injected capital into banks by taking
ownership of preferred shares of stock. It directed
$125 billion to nine major banks and a like amount to
smaller needy but healthy banks.
In a less anticipated move, TARP funds became
the emergency source of funds to General Motors and
Chrysler. An ambivalent President Bush responded to
the ailing auto builders headed toward what he called
a “disorderly bankruptcy” in the time between the
election and President-elect Obama’s inaugural. Bush
said, “I believe that good policy is not to dump [on
Obama] a major catastrophe in his first day of office.”
From TARP, short-term loans were made to facilitate
restructuring at GM and Chrysler in an attempt to
prevent both layoffs and bankruptcy. The Obama administration put in place an Auto Task Force, which
oversaw subsequent orderly bankruptcies, resulting in
Chrysler eventually being reorganized, then partnering with Fiat. In 2014, Fiat completed its acquisition
of Chrysler. A reshaped GM also made a successful

recovery. The auto bail-outs made taxpayers unsecured
creditors to these public corporations. It should be
added that the Treasury began selling its stake in General Motors in 2013 and completed the sale of its last
holding in December, reportedly losing $9 billion on
an investment of $49.5 billion (183).
The government’s reported loss regarding General
Motors triggers the question, what did the crisis responses by the federal government cost the American
taxpayer? Perhaps the most authoritative judgment
about the cost of TAROO cost is that of the Office of
Management and Budget in 2014: an estimated $39
billion. Following a labored discussion of the question,
Wallach argues that “any grand total calculated for the
government’s crisis responses will say as much about
the author’s assumptions as about the underlying
facts…. [W]e can nevertheless say with certainty that
the responses cost less than most observers initially expected, so that citing the dollar costs of the bailouts
became a less compelling critique of the administration as time went by” (185).
What cannot be gainsaid is that the measures
crafted by Paulson and Bernanke during the Bush administration, and continued under Geithner and Bernanke during the Obama administration, did prevent
a financial collapse that might have become truly catastrophic. As a political commentator myself, I think
that it is remarkable to note how peripheral to the
presidential election in the fall of 2008 the crisis was.
Its issues were largely ignored during the campaign.
After the transition from Republican Bush to Democrat Obama, there was no sharp reshaping of the crisis
responses. To the contrary, Obama continued what
Bush set in motion, retaining Bernanke at the Federal
Reserve and moving Geithner from the Federal Reserve in New York to Treasury Secretary.
It is true that the crisis responses did necessarily
pick economic winners and losers. J.P. Morgan Chase
was a winner because Paulson engineered a bargain
price for its acquisition of Bear Stearns. Yet all of
Lehman’s interested parties lost in its unaided collapse.
AIG executives and investors suffered a great deal,
but the company survives. So do General Motors and
Chrysler, though hugely changed. But Ford, taking no
federal funds, could have been a huge winner had GM
and Chrysler bankruptcies been harsher. What about
homeowners with mortgages who suffered value losses
because overvalued mortgage-backed securities put the
housing market into a downward spiral? Ordinary savers, trying to live on interest earnings, took a haircut as
interest rates plummeted to near zero, where the rates
have persisted to the present day.

The complexity of Wallach’s explanatory task is exacerbated by the need to identify agencies, programs,
and financial terminology relevant to the story. To Wallach’s credit, he did his best to account for and identify
the agencies and programs relevant to the story told
in this book. There is, for example, a four-page, fiftytwo item, alphabetically ordered “glossary of crisis laws
and programs,” listed by their acronyms (from “ABCP.
Asset-backed commercial paper; short term bonds
backed by physical assets” to “WaMu. Washington
Mutual Bank.”) Wallach’s footnote citations fill over
80 pages of the book—pages 223 to 306—with 952
footnotes, most of them citing more than one source.
To the Edge actually celebrates the success of nimble policy administration because in reality, the American economy was close to total disaster, one that was
arrested by incentives to corporate America from the
Treasury and the Federal Reserve. Prudently, Wallach
does not expend much effort parsing out blame for
the origins of the crisis of 2008. His critical observations about how the federal government responded
are simplified by applying the term “adhocracy.” He
faults policymakers for improvising crisis responses,
some quite arbitrary, with tenuous statutory support.
Of course, that opinion was not rare in the financial
community. To this day there are cases pending. For
example, former AIG Chairman Maurice Greenberg
is still in federal court contesting the fairness of the
government take-over of his company without “just
compensation” (see June 15, 2015 issue of the The
New York Times). Indeed, Wallach gets the title for
his book from former Federal Reserve chairman, Paul
Volcker, who saw the Fed’s actions as extending “to
the very edge of its lawful and implied powers” (54).
Wallach has an easier time delineating the stretching
of legal boundaries than he does with differentiating
legitimacy/illegitimacy standards apart from the law.
Before departing his rendition of the crisis and its
aftermath, Wallach offers some prescriptions for how
government should arrange policy for the “next time”
such an economic challenge emerges. His expressed
hope for a “more active legislature” sounds rather like
dutiful constitutionalism instead of realistic advice.
Congress does not do well at anticipating long-term
future challenges, but, as in this case, it does l e n d
legal authority in times of crisis. Wallach’s strongest
pitch is for “an accountable slush fund” (213 ff), of
$50 or $100 billion for the Secretary of the Treasury
to spend with discretion in times of exigency. Imagine
the Tea Party response to that proposition. What congressional members, seeking reelection, would defend
a vote in favor of such a proposal?
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Wallach has given us a seriously directed, thoroughly documented rendition of a complicated,
government-managed calming of the U.S. Great Recession. On the whole Paulson, Bernanke, Geithner,
and their governmental minions, though guilty of
choosing winners and losers with some arbitrariness,
contained the disaster to the benefit of and greater
good for most Americans. We who seek public justice
on moral standards can question specifics, but on the
whole, public peace was preserved by the steady hands
of those in governmental authority. Relatively mild
protests from the right (Tea Party) and left (Occupy
Wall Street) necessitated no tanks in the streets. Curiously, the elected politicians did not divide by party
but coalesced in support of prudent policy measures
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from first a Republican administration and then a
Democratic one.
This book is not an easy read, but Wallach has devised his own eleven-page summary of its essentials in
a recent essay, “Democratically Accountable Adhocracy? The Challenges of Legitimating the Responses
to the 2008 Financial Crisis,” available online at The
Brookings Institute’s website.1 Readers of this review
may find Wallach’s essay as much as they care to know
about Wallach’s recommendations.
Endnote
1. www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/06/17–
legitimating–financial–crisis–adhocracy–wallach

